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Cross Ref: Apts 2*
IC 75-2594
18 November 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC
AD/DCI/IC

SUBJECT: NSDM on Intelligence During Crises

REFERENCE: C/PRD's Memo to AD/DCI/IC of 21 Oct 75:
A Proposal Concerning the Crisis Management Problem

1. Attached are: (a) a draft memo for the President which argues the case for the establishment, via a NSDM, of a WSAG Crisis Task Force under the control of the DCI; (b) a draft NSDM (done by [redacted] 25X1 [redacted] which would direct the establishment of such a Task Force and a national information center which would, among other things, support the Task Force; and (c) a memo from [redacted] 25X1 which lays out the rationale for the establishment of this national information center (which he calls, somewhat inaccurately, a National Alerting and Crisis Communication Center).

2. For purposes of this exercise, we reviewed a number of NSDMs issued over the last year or so and have concluded that it would not be inappropriate for the DCI to propose a NSDM of this sort. Some NSDMs have been preceded by National Security Study Memoranda, but others were apparently prompted by studies or memoranda prepared elsewhere in the Government, e.g., the Under Secretaries Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of Defense. Guidance concerning NSDMs (provided in the very first NSDM) seems intentionally imprecise about the manner of their preparation: "This series shall be used to report Presidential decisions (whether the result of NSC meetings or appropriate consultation with the Department head concerned)."

3. The drafts of the memo and NSDM combine the notion of the WSAG Task Force (which is essentially the DCI's notion) with [redacted] 25X1 proposal for the information center, but I confess that this wedding makes me (the father!) a little uneasy. Perhaps the two should remain separate. Truth is, the White House Situation Room probably should


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(and presumably could) do all the things that proposes. In any 25X1 event, the establishment of an information center would not require a NSDM.

4. I have not yet sought comments on this package from anyone outside of PRD.



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C/PRD

Attachments: a/s

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PRD DRAFT/18 November 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. In your memorandum to me of 18 May concerning the Mayaguez incident you asked for any recommendations I might have for improving the ability of the National Security Council machinery to deal effectively with crisis situations. In my letter to you of 23 May, which discussed the functioning of the Intelligence Community during that incident, I suggested that our intelligence system was essentially sound but could benefit from some repairs and "fine-tuning." And I promised that we would undertake the kind of "preventive maintenance" necessary to assure the highest standards of performance.

2. I wish now to report that in the intervening months we have reexamined our approaches to crisis-related problems in the light of our Mayaguez experience; have sought, and I think found, solutions to a number of these problems; and have developed proposals which--if approved by you and implemented in an appropriate National Security Decision Memorandum--could in my view contribute in a significant way to the ability of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Community to provide effective support to you and other top-level decision makers, especially during times of crisis. I would like, below, to explain in some detail the considerations lying behind this proposal and (beginning with paragraph 5) outline the specifics of the proposals themselves.

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~~SECRET~~The Problems

3. Several difficulties face the Intelligence Community when it is called on to respond to fast-breaking events abroad. There are, of course, questions of substance and analysis peculiar to each crisis. There are also problems of organization and procedure which confront us in virtually all crises. These latter, which affect the collection, the convergence, and the conveyance of information, are the problems we address here:

- *The collection of information.* It is, of course, necessary during crises to collect pertinent information as rapidly as possible. This in turn requires: an awareness of the quantity and quality of the collection resources which can be brought to bear on the problems at hand; the identification of those collection resources which can be used most effectively; and the actual assignment of tasks to the various organizations that manage the particular collection resources concerned. But no one person or organization is responsible for tasking the enormous number of US Government entities and military units which collect information on developments abroad, or even has direct access to the sundry communications systems which serve them. Thus, in particularly pressing circumstances, it is sometimes not easy to obtain data on the specific capabilities of each potential collector, and it is sometimes not possible to task these collectors in as efficacious a manner as might be desired (or expected).

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- *The convergence of information.* Information must at some stage be disseminated, collated, and assessed if it is to serve a coherent purpose. This can be a complex, time-consuming, and sometimes highly imperfect process if--as is frequently the case during crises--the information is acquired by many and diverse sources, is transmitted by a number of different means, and is initially received in a variety of places.*

- *The conveyance of information.* There is no point in collecting and converging information if it does not reach senior policy makers in time to support their efforts to deal with the crisis at hand. But finding the best way to provide the National Security Council and/or the Washington Special Action Group with the best available information in the least amount of time is an uncertain science even in the best of circumstances, which crises obviously are not. I have usually been confident that the machinery supporting me has supplied the data and the assessments I need to provide these committees with up-to-the-minute briefings and appropriate published intelligence. Nevertheless, given the nature

*Some of the specific problems that from time to time impede the orderly flow of information emerged during the Mayaguez crisis, even though that crisis was short and relatively clear cut. For example: A number of senior intelligence officials and analysts found it difficult to maintain currency during the crisis because they did not know (or found out late) what actions the US was taking. One of the reasons for this was simply that the various Community and non-Community agencies concerned with the Mayaguez problem were not always in close touch with one another; information tends to flow vertically, through the chains of command within individual agencies, rather than laterally, and this seems to be especially so during crises.

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of some crises, and given the constraints of local geography, existing communications facilities, and my position vis-a-vis other elements of the Community and the Government as a whole, I am quite concerned that in some circumstances the quality and the timeliness of intelligence will not always be all that it should be.

The Proposals

5. Several efforts to ease these kinds of problems are now under way in the Community. We are, inter alia, improving the procedures that govern the rapid handling of critical information, and we are tying together the various Washington Operations and Watch Centers into a more cohesive warning network. An especially promising effort to rationalize the tasking of worldwide Defense Department collection resources during crises is under development in the Defense Intelligence Agency. Through the means of an elaborate, computerized Collection Coordination Facility (CCF) within the National Military Intelligence Center, DIA hopes to be able to coordinate the use of a variety of collectors--from tactical aircraft to SIGINT satellites--and to make quick adjustments in collection tasks, as events demand.

6. There are, I think, further improvements needed, and they will require the creation of a kind of harmony and order we now lack: more effective exchanges of information, more centralized guidance and tasking procedures, and more systematized support of the framers of national policy. I believe that some basic restructuring of the Community's crisis support machinery is now both feasible and desirable. Specifically,

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I would urge the creation of two new bodies:

-- A WSAG (or NSC) task force, pulled together to provide direct intelligence support to policy makers during crises; consisting of substantive and collection experts nominated by the DCI and drawn from the Community and from other Government agencies (e.g., the JCS), as appropriate; chaired by the DCI or his representative (perhaps in most instances the appropriate National Intelligence Officer); entitled to draw on all available analytical and reporting resources; and empowered to establish priorities for and levy tasks on all available collection resources.

-- A national information center, organized (perhaps as an adjunct of the White House Situation Room) to "broker" the information and intelligence needs of all Government entities; to maintain up-to-date information on the entire national "nervous system" (including the addresses and telephone numbers of all the many Government and military watch centers here and abroad, the kinds of expertise which could be tapped through these centers, and the best and fastest means of reaching and communicating with the appropriate centers); and, on request, during international crises, to assist the DCI and WSAG crisis task forces to obtain and converge information from a wide variety of governmental sources.

7. The WSAG serves as a vehicle for coordinated policy making during crises. What I propose here is, essentially, the establishment of a coordinated effort to inform that process in the most efficient way possible and with the most helpful information obtainable. Existing

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arrangements suffer somewhat from a lack of coordination; as new means of collection are introduced, demands on these arrangements are likely to increase. It is becoming ever more apparent, in my view, that the functioning and tasking of our intelligence structure should reflect the needs of the highest levels of Government (e.g., WSAG) and not be delegated to any single agency or system. I believe that, in order to reorganize along the lines proposed and to avoid any misunderstandings among the agencies concerned, it would be advisable to issue a new NSDM dealing with crisis support. Accordingly, I have attached for your consideration a preliminary draft of the sort of NSDM I think would be most appropriate.

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IC 75-2588
11 November 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

THROUGH: Chief, Product Review Division

SUBJECT: Proposed National Alerting and Crisis
Center (NACCC)

The attached draft on the above subject is a proposal related to the general warning and crisis operation problems under current discussion. Modifications and additions you suggested have been incorporated. The proposal might be considered in relation to our efforts to propose a NSDM on warning and crisis operations.



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
Product Review Division

Attachment - As Stated

Distribution:

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1 - C/PRD (& PRD Chrono)
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NATIONAL ALERTING AND CRISIS
COMMUNICATION CENTER (NACCC)

I. Background

Post mortems of past warning and crisis situations have revealed that each crisis is unique in terms of the problems posed and that in each case the bureaucratic structure of our government is not an ideal match to the requirements of the crisis. Crises can be foreign, or domestic, or both; economic, military or diplomatic or a mix of all three. Thus in every warning and crisis situation widely disparate elements of the government become involved. The problem becomes one of identifying and converging the substantive information from elements under the pressure of time. The urgency stems from the fact that the first objective during the warning phase is to avoid the crisis and, failing that, to contain the crisis in such a way as to achieve our national objectives without having the situation degenerate into armageddon.

Information requirements during warning and crisis situations are not confined to matters regarding the external threat (primarily derived from agencies of the Intelligence Community). An accurate and timely input is necessary regarding our own actions, both military and diplomatic which might induce foreign responses. In addition, information

regarding the possible execution of contingency military plans must be included. Also contemplated preparatory actions to implement plans become vital information to the policy maker inasmuch as such preparations might become a signal (wittingly or unwittingly) to an opponent. All of these inputs require the convergence of critical information from widely separated elements within our own government.

An effort is current underway within the National Security Council to identify our own national nervous system. The effort will be based on a survey of the many watch centers that our government operates (usually on a 24 hour basis) in the Washington area, CONUS, and overseas. The objective is to produce a directory which not only indicates phone numbers and other communication addresses but a short summary of the kinds of information handled by each center. Eventually the study will include how the centers are interconnected which will allow a "map" to be drawn of our national nervous system.

When the NSC study is completed (and kept up to date) it will be possible to create a capstone to the system in the form of a 24 hour National Alerting and Crisis Communication Center (NACCC). This center would not be manned by substantive analysts or experts in all possible areas of warning and crisis problems. Instead the NACCC personnel should be expert on the structure of the national nervous system. They should know for a given warning or crisis

situation what elements of the government should be involved and how these elements can be reached quickly by a variety of communication means and how they might be conferenced remotely if face-to-face meetings are not feasible.

The NACCC should be able, by means of communication techniques, to converge the information needed to support a variety of policy and decision elements in the government, not only the President and cabinet level departments but also such organizations as the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), or the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) of the Director of Central Intelligence. A warning and crisis situation often requires a shift in support to various elements depending on whether the crisis is in the diplomatic or military phase.

There are a number of basic issues which would have to be studied such as how to handle sensitive information and the location of the center (including the relation of the center to the White House Situation Room).

II. Characteristics of the NACCC should include:

- A. Periodically updated data on the national nervous system.
- B. Current data on private power and communication control centers.
- C. Displays of A and B.
- D. 24 hour operation.
- E. Communications with elements within A and B (above)

and in some cases emergency or backup circuits.

F. Capability for several types of remote conferencing including voice, teletype, visual, computer, or combinations of these media.

G. Automated files on

1. key personnel
2. key government positions
3. private expert consultants

H. Files on emergency action procedures including:

1. military
2. non-military (e.g. warning notices to mariners, commercial aircraft, common carriers, etc.)

I. Contingency plans for a limited number of a variety of scenarios, foreign and domestic (warning or crisis by geographic area; by type such as national disaster, terrorist attack, blackouts of power and/or communications, etc.)

J. Periodic tests and exercises based on scenarios in I above.

K. Emergency auxiliary power and communications.

II. Location

(A special study should be made on the optimum location of the primary NACCC as well as alternate(s) contemplating the separate threats of terror and nuclear war. The location study should consider the current and emergency locations of those elements which will support the NACCC as well as those elements supported by the NACCC.)

III. Security (A special study is necessary.)

IV. Personnel

- A. A minimum of two at all times.
- B. Capability of expansion in off duty hours.
- C. Long tours to maintain continuity.
- D. High career status with background in senior watch officer service.
- E. Training and research programs.
- F. All source clearances.

V. Maintenance

Primarily to be performed by contractors with quick response capability on 24 hour basis.